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Notes
What Got Us Here, Won’t Get Us There:
Why U.S. Commercial Space Policy Must Lie in an
Independent Regulatory Agency
GERARDO INZUNZA HIGUERA†
This Note addresses the need for a comprehensive, centralized independent agency designated
solely for the management of commercial space activities. The current commercial “space rush”
promises unimaginable possibilities and profits for a burgeoning sector, yet no single federal
agency has been entrusted with the regulation of this nascent industry. Currently, the United
States has settled into an inefficient, fragmented regulatory approach that unduly burdens
commercial players and frustrates its national objective of fostering a robust commercial lowEarth orbit economy. This Note analyzes proposals by Congress for such a new regulatory agency
and concludes by proposing a new framework that encourages expert-driven commercial space
regulations void of political adulteration, while also establishing a regulatory system that can be
exported to other spacefaring nations.

† J.D. Candidate 2022, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would like to thank
Professor Dorit Rubinstein Reiss for not only introducing me to the fascinating world of administrative law, but
more importantly for being an incredible mentor. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal staff for
their hard work and insightful feedback. Finally, I would like to thank Joaquin Benavente and Samar Lightfoot
for their unconditional support. This Note is dedicated to my mother, who taught me that there are no limits in
this world for those with an abundance of imagination.
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INTRODUCTION
The passage of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitive Act of
20151 (CSLCA) signaled to the world that the United States was not only ready
for, but actively engaging in, its manifest destiny of the “final frontier.”2
However, as the first country to adopt national legislation aimed at establishing
a regulatory framework for commercial space activities—including the
appropriation of space resources—it is in the United States’ best interest to set
forth a cohesive and comprehensive standard.3 This standard must ensure that
democratic values of justice and cooperation are also exported to, and at the
forefront of, any future global commercial space policies. Since the enactment
of the CSLCA, the United States’ efforts to further its national space policies
continue to increase without any signs of slowing down. The Trump
administration, over the course of four years, implemented a slew of executive
orders aimed at “encouraging and facilitating the continued growth of a domestic
commercial space sector.”4 However, the orders lacked cohesion and simply
amounted to an amalgamation of somewhat unconnected directives to various
executive agencies and political entities. The absence of any substantive
guidance and the infusion of political rhetoric throughout the executive orders
highlight another problem with these directives; namely, the politicization of
what should be expert-driven decisions. Additionally, current statutes and
directives relating to commercial space activities continue to disregard the
pressing need to establish a framework for an integrated global space ecosystem
that is necessary for sharing vital in-orbit data among spacefaring nations.
As the self-appointed global leader in commercial space policy, this
patchwork approach is not only unsustainable, but incompatible with the United
States’ obligation to establish a cohesive standard for the rest of the world to
emulate. Creating a model regulatory framework that incorporates western
democratic values into commercial space activities is a necessary step if the
United States is to continue exerting its power and leadership in space
throughout the rest of the twenty-first century and beyond. This Note argues the
need for establishing a domestic independent regulatory agency with
comprehensive powers to regulate commercial space activities, with the
intention of serving as a model system for other nations to emulate, given that

1. Pub. L. No. 114–90, 129 Stat. 705 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and
51 U.S.C.).
2. The colloquial reference to the famous description of space in the opening narration of the science
fiction TV series, Star Trek. Star Trek: The Original Series: The Man Trap (NBC television broadcast Sept. 8,
1966).
3. Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Neta Palkovitz, Regulation of Space Resource Rights: Meeting the Needs of
States and Private Parties, 35 QUESTIONS OF INT’L L. 5, 10 (2017) (“The first state to adopt national legislation
was the United States. The Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA) was passed on 25
November, 2015.”).
4. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,755, 81,755 (Dec. 16, 2020) (from 2017 to 2020, the Trump
administration implemented eleven executive orders directed at commercial space policy initiatives).
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the ultimate goal is to incorporate these various systems into one interdependent
global ecosystem.
I. THE THREE SECTORS OF SPACE REGULATIONS:
NATIONAL SECURITY, CIVIL, AND COMMERCIAL
The United States’ current approach to space regulations is segmented
largely based on subject matter and showcases why there is a clear need for a
comprehensive, centralized agency dedicated exclusively to commercial space
activities.5 Currently, the United States’ space policies and regulatory schemes
are divided into three sectors: (1) national security; (2) civil; and (3)
commercial.6
A. NATIONAL SECURITY—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE U.S. SPACE
FORCE
The Department of Defense (“DOD”) is the governmental body designated
to oversee the national security of the United States, including deterring and
countering threats from space.7 The Trump administration and Congress
furthered the United States’ intent of exercising political and physical dominion
over the use of space by establishing a new military branch—the United States
Space Force (“Space Force”)—to enable offensive and defensive space
operations.8 Given the national security threats implicated by orbital debris, the
DOD also operates the Space Surveillance Network, which monitors and tracks
orbital debris larger than ten centimeters in diameter9 in what is commonly
referred to as Space Situational Awareness (“SSA”).10
In 2019, the DOD reestablished the U.S. Space Command
(“USSPACECOM”), a unit specifically devoted to deterring aggressions and
conflicts from other countries in space,11 in response to the changing reality that
eleven nations now also have the industrial capability to develop, manufacture,

5. See id. at 81,765 (describing how space regulations concerning national security and space exploration
are primarily overseen by a single agency—DOD and NASA respectively—while space regulations concerning
commercial activities are currently overseen by multiple agencies).
6. See id. (“The United States conducts space activities in three distinct but interdependent sectors:
commercial, civil, and national security.”).
7. Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, on Space Policy Directive-4:
Establishment of the United States Space Force (Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Space Policy Directive-4],
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Mar/01/2002095015/-1/-1/1/SPACE-POLICY-DIRECTIVE-4-FINAL.PDF;
see also STEPHEN M. MCCALL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10337, CHALLENGES TO THE UNITED STATES IN SPACE
(2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10337.pdf (explaining that the Space Force was established after the
enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020).
8. Space Policy Directive-4, supra note 7; The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,770–71.
9. DANIEL MORGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45416, COMMERCIAL SPACE: FEDERAL REGULATION,
OVERSIGHT, AND UTILIZATION 15 (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45416/2.
10. Id. at 16; see also 10 U.S.C. § 2274 (authorizing DOD to provide SSA services and information to nonU.S. government entities, including U.S. and foreign commercial entities).
11. Space Policy Directive-4, supra note 7; The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,770–71.
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launch, and operate their own space systems.12 The need for reestablishing such
an entity became apparent after China conducted tests in 2007 and 2013 of a
ground-based, direct-ascent anti-satellite (“ASAT”) system that was used to
destroy aging Chinese weather satellites, showcasing China’s capability of
destroying American satellites as well.13
As commercial space activities grow, analysts and observers increasingly
find it inappropriate for the DOD to bear the responsibility of providing safety
services for commercial operations.14 In the 2018 Space Policy Directive-3
(“SPD-3”), the Trump administration acknowledged that as the number of space
objects increase, the DOD’s limited space traffic management (“STM”) and
then-architecture were becoming increasingly inadequate.15 Additionally, SPD3 also instructs federal agencies to develop new policies and regulations for
future U.S. orbital operations aimed at creating a framework designed to operate
in increasingly congested space traffic,16 and identifies the Department of
Commerce as the civil agency in charge of publicly releasing DOD SSA data.17
However, SPD-3 runs counter to Section 110 of the CSCLA, in which Congress
specifically directed the Department of Transportation, acting through the
Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) Office of Commercial Space
Transportation—not the Department of Commerce—to study the feasibility of
taking on the responsibility of processing and releasing SSA data to commercial
actors.18 The urgent need for designating a federal department or agency—other
than the DOD—to provide SSA services is further underscored by Congress’s
mandate that the President submit such a plan to Congress.19 The contradictions
between SPD-3 and the CSCLA exemplify the inefficiencies of the current
fragmented regulatory approach to commercial space policies and show the need
for a comprehensive, centralized federal agency dedicated exclusively to
regulating and overseeing commercial space endeavors.
B. CIVIL—NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) is the
governmental body in charge of overseeing the civil division of the United
States’ space program.20 NASA was originally established in 1958 for the
12. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 7.
13. JAMES A. VEDDA & PETER L. HAYS, MAJOR POLICY ISSUES IN EVOLVING GLOBAL SPACE OPERATIONS
49 (2018) (China conducted another similar test in May 2013, again showcasing these capabilities).
14. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 9, at 16; see also VEDDA & HAYS, supra note 13, at 7.
15. Memorandum from Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, on Space Policy Directive-3:
National Space Traffic Management Policy (June 18, 2018) [hereinafter Space Policy Directive-3],
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-3-national-space-trafficmanagement-policy.
16. Id.
17. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 9, at 16.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 17.
20. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 51 U.S.C. § 20102.
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purpose of securing and advancing U.S. leadership in aeronautics,
communications satellites, and Earth remote sensing.21 Since then, and
particularly as a result of the Trump administration’s focused efforts through its
National Space Policy Memorandum from December 9, 202022 (“National
Space Policy Memo”), the agency has restructured and repositioned its efforts
towards space exploration with four strategic goals: (1) encouraging scientific
discovery; (2) expanding human presence in space and long-term exploration to
the Moon, Mars, and beyond; (3) developing and promoting revolutionary
technologies and promoting these to catalyze economic growth; and (4) enabling
NASA’s capabilities and operations in furtherance of its missions.23 These
evolving agency directives are dependent on a robust governmental partnership
and commercialization strategy with the U.S. private sector in order to develop
a competitive low-Earth orbit (LEO24) economy.25 NASA intends to shift its
operations in space from relying solely on the International Space Station
(“ISS”) to relying on new commercial orbital platforms, as it becomes a
consumer in the private sector rather than a primary supplier of these capabilities
following the expected cessation of direct U.S. federal funding for the ISS in
2025.26 However, given the current fragmentation of commercial space
regulations, there are currently no federal rules relating to the operation of
privately-owned commercial orbital platforms or private vehicles in space,
further frustrating the agency’s enumerated objectives.27
In the coming years, NASA sees itself as being one of many customers of
privately-owned platforms and cargo transportation services that will enable a
variety of activities in LEO.28 Given this new vision, having a centralized federal
21. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NASA STRATEGIC PLAN 2018 22, 55 (2018),
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/nasa_2018_strategic_plan.pdf.
22. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,756.
23. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 21, at 7–8; see also Memorandum from Donald J.
Trump, President of the United States, on Space Policy Directive-1: Reinvigorating America’s Human Space
Exploration Program (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Space Policy Directive-1], https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/
spd-1.pdf.
24. See BILL CANIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10415, CHANGES IN THE U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE INDUSTRY
(2016), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10415 (explaining how satellites are placed in different
orbits depending on their planned use: (1) low-Earth orbit (LEO) is reserved for the ISS, other orbital platforms,
or satellites that provide higher-resolution images because they are close to Earth and revolve around the planet
every 90 minutes; (2) medium-Earth orbit (MEO) is typically reserved for Global Positioning System (GPS)
satellites; (3) geosynchronous-Earth orbit (GEO) is traditionally reserved for television or weather satellites, as
these match the Earth’s rotational speed and thus remain in the same place above Earth enabling them to monitor
the same location for changes in weather or to facilitate telecommunications; and (4) high-Earth orbit (HEO)).
25. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 21, at 1; see also NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE
ADMIN., NASA PLAN FOR COMMERCIAL LEO DEVELOPMENT 1 (2019), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/commleodevt_plan_6-7-19_final1.pdf.
26. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 21, at 1; NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
supra note 25, at 1–2.
27. ALYSSA K. KING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46500, THE FUTURE OF SPACE TOURISM 4–5 (2020),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/space/R46500.pdf (“There are currently no federal rules related to suborbital operations
or to the operation of privately owned space stations and private vehicles in space.”).
28. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 25, at 2.
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agency dedicated exclusively to regulating and overseeing these commercial
space activities is of paramount and pressing importance. NASA itself
recognizes that to further its policy directives, there must be a regulatory
environment in LEO that enables U.S. commercial space activities to thrive, with
the aim of eventually leading our international partners to adopt what will
hopefully be a successful American regulatory system.29
C. COMMERCIAL—THE AMERICAN SPACE COMMERCE FREE ENTERPRISE ACT
OF 2019
Unlike the national security and civil sectors, the commercial sector is
neither governed nor regulated by a particular governmental body, mostly
because of a lack of a pressing need for it; that is, until now. Although Congress
attempted to address this problem with the American Space Commerce Free
Enterprise Act of 2019 (“ASCFEA”),30 the Act failed to adequately address the
current commercial space sector’s regulatory system’s inefficiencies,
administrative burdens, and lack of transparency.31 This failure is a problem, not
only because certain portions of both the civil and national security sectors
expect to rely on commercial services and capabilities to supplant their own,32
but also because this approach undermines the United States’ stated efforts of
establishing a centralized federal agency for commercial space activities that
should serve as an international model for other countries.33
The ASCFEA entrusts the Secretary of Commerce (the “Secretary”), acting
through the Office of Space Commerce (“OSC”), with the role of being the sole
administrator authorized to implement and oversee the provisions of the
ASCFEA.34 The Act enumerates specific responsibilities for the OSC to oversee:
(1) ensuring that nongovernmental (commercial) space activities are carried out
in conformity with international obligations; (2) authorizing and overseeing the
certification process for commercial space activities; (3) overseeing the
mitigation of space debris; (4) evaluating the development of commercial space
activities through a newly established entity, the Private Space Activity
Advisory Committee (created to identify the challenges facing the private sector,
avoiding adverse environmental changes to the Earth from space activities, and
to provide recommendations to the Secretary and Congress); and (5) ensuring

29. Id. at 4.
30. American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, H.R. 3610, 116th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2019).
31. Id.
32. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,762–65 (seeking to transfer “routine operational space
functions to the commercial space sector” such as SSA data and basic space traffic coordination); see also NAT’L
AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 25, at 11 (explaining NASA’s framework for commercial
development of LEO involves turning over LEO operations to the private sector and simply becoming one of
many customers).
33. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,755.
34. H.R. 3610 § 80101(8) (defining “Secretary”), § 80103(c)(5) (explaining the nondelegable nature of the
Secretary’s responsibilities for certifications applications and requirements, including to the OSC).
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the United States remains the world leader in commercial space activities.35 The
ASCFEA also elevated the head of the OSC from a Senior Executive (appointed
by the Secretary) to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce (acting as the Director
of the OSC), thus requiring appointment by the President and confirmation by
the Senate.36 This seemingly innocuous change highlights another central
problem of the ASCFEA’s approach; the politicization of a new federal agency
charged with promulgating commercial space regulations that must be based on
expertise rather than political preference.
II. THE INEFFICIENCIES OF A FRAGMENTED ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH:
LESSONS FROM FEMA37
The creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) in
1978 was largely in response to the lack of a comprehensive, coordinated
national emergency management system, which resulted in decades of
inefficient and fragmented responses to national disasters.38 From 1803 to 1950,
more than 128 laws relating to disaster relief were passed by Congress as a
consequence of not having a centralized authority.39 As a result of this
fragmentation, by 1978, more than 100 federal agencies claimed jurisdiction
over different aspects of emergency management, often resulting in a slow
government response to major catastrophes.40 However, it was not until the
partial meltdown of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generation Station in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, that the need for a centralized management agency
became overwhelmingly apparent.41
During the partial meltdown on March 28, 1979, Pennsylvania Governor
Richard Thornburgh was given conflicting recommendations by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) that resulted in public confusion and
hysteria.42 While the emergency Executive Management Team recommended a
ten-mile evacuation based on the readings it was provided by the plant, the
NRC’s regional inspectors at the reactor were informing Governor Thornburgh
that no evacuation was needed.43 Unable to provide the public with a conclusive
answer as to whether an evacuation was necessary, President Jimmy Carter

35. H.R. 3610 § 2(a)(1) (international obligations), § 2(a)(4) (certification process), § 80104(a)(1)
(mitigation of space debris), §§ 80109(a), (e)(1–8) (continual evaluation of commercial space activities),
§ 2(c)(2) (remains global leader in commercial space activities).
36. H.R. 3610 § 7(2).
37. Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”).
38. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, WE ARE FEMA HELPING PEOPLE BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER
DISASTERS 16–17 (2019), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/publication-one_english_2019.pdf.
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Id.
42. WILLIAM W. CHENAULT, GARY D. HILBERT & SETH D. REICHLIN, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
RS 2-8-34, EVACUATION PLANNING IN THE TMI ACCIDENT 6 (1980), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
a080104.pdf.
43. Id.
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called an emergency meeting to understand the source of the conflict and found
the problem to be the diffusion of responsibility between the agencies
involved.44 Specifically, the NRC was designated as the lead technical agency,
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (“FDAA”) was the lead federal
agency responsible for the organization and coordination of a federal response
to support potential evacuations, and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
(“DCPA”) was in charge of evaluating the State’s evacuation plan.45
Additionally, the Bureau of Radiation Protection (“BRP”) and the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), alongside the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources (“DER”), all were responsible for
assessing any potential radiation exposure to the surrounding populations.46 The
fragmentation and incoordination between the agencies resulted in the
conflicting reports that both Governor Thornburgh and President Carter were
expected to use to provide the public with the important directive of either
evacuating the surrounding areas or staying put—an impossible task when no
clear answer could be deduced from the reports.47 Therefore, given the
inefficient and vexed fragmented response, the Three Mile Island disaster
cemented the need for a centralized agency for emergency management.48
In response to the disaster, President Carter established FEMA on April 1,
1979, and shortly thereafter gave the agency the dual mission of emergency
management and civil defense.49 By concentrating the management of
emergency responses in one central agency, FEMA allowed for the
conglomeration of many dispersed executive agencies that claimed jurisdiction,
such as the DCPA (from the DOD), the FDAA (from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development), and the Federal Preparedness Agency (from the
independent General Services Administration).50 This centralization increased
the efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal Government’s response to
national disasters.51 The importance of having such a comprehensive,
centralized emergency management entity was later reaffirmed by President
William (“Bill”) J. Clinton’s decision to elevate the FEMA Director to a cabinetlevel position, following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.52
The United States must apply what it learned from the pre-FEMA
framework to the commercial space sector, given that its inefficiencies and
fragmentation serve as a cautionary tale. Although the United States’ national
space policy infrastructure is still in its infancy, it is bound to result in a

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 6, 26.
Id. at 26.
Id.
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 38, at 17.
Id.
Id. at 17–18.
Id.
Id. at 21.
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fragmented and inefficient regulatory framework if Congress fails to establish
an independent, comprehensive, centralized commercial space agency. The
Trump administration’s National Space Policy Memo is showing signs of this
problem already, given that six government entities currently hold jurisdiction
over commercial space policies under its directives, including: (1) The Office of
Commercial Space Transportation53 (“AST”) (under the Department of
Transportation); (2) the OSC54 (under the Department of Commerce); (3)
NASA55; (4) the National Space Council56 (under the Executive Office of the
President); (5) the Office of Science and Technology Policy57 (“OSTP”) (a
department under the Executive Office of the President); and (6) the National
Science and Technology Council58 (“NSTC”) (a council under the Executive
Office of the President). If the United States is to learn from its mistakes, it must
approach the commercialization of space in a proactive manner by actively
anticipating and preparing for what is to come, and by avoiding the mistakes
highlighted by the pre-FEMA regulatory morass.
III. THE UNITED STATES’ CURRENT FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO
COMMERCIAL SPACE POLICY
Since before the decommissioning of NASA’s space shuttle program in
2011,59 the United States has taken a fragmented regulatory approach through
the use of multiple federal agencies to regulate the commercial space
industry60—eerily reminiscent of the pre-FEMA emergency management
framework.61 Like the inefficiencies that plagued the pre-FEMA framework, the
current commercial space regulatory scheme is showing signs of fragmentation
that are leading to inefficient responses as a result of this patchwork approach—
currently only addressing commercial space developments through the oversight
of agency programs and budgets, rather than by passing comprehensive
legislation.62 For example, the administration of export licenses for spacecraft
and other commodities related to launch vehicles, missiles, and rockets, is
currently managed by both the Department of Commerce and the Department of
State.63 Therefore, a commercial actor who wishes to acquire an export license
for any space-related commodity would need to either spend the resources to

53. About the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.: OFF. OF COM. SPACE
TRANSP., https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
54. OFF. OF SPACE COM, https://www.space.commerce.gov (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
55. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://www.nasa.gov (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
56. NAT’L SPACE COUNCIL, https://www.space.commerce.gov/category/national-space-council (last
visited Jan. 3, 2022).
57. OFF. OF SCI. & SPACE POL’Y, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
58. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/nstc (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
59. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24.
60. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 9, at 1.
61. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 38, at 16.
62. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 9, at 1.
63. Id. at 10.

January 2022

WHAT GOT US HERE, WON’T GET US THERE

115

obtain duplicative licenses from both departments, or spend the resources to
decipher which department has jurisdiction over their particular transaction.
Both instances expose the inefficiencies and wastefulness in which the current
approach burdens commercial space actors.
The current regulation of in-orbit activities is an incomplete patchwork that
requires commercial actors to consult with a slew of federal agencies for the
launching of commercial satellites.64 For example, the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) oversees radio frequency use for satellite communications
and geostationary Earth orbit (“GEO”) orbital slot assignments.65 Additionally,
a commercial entity must also consult with the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) and the Commercial Remote Sensing
Regulatory Affairs Office66 (under the Department of Commerce)—which both
regulate commercial remote sensing—to obtain a remote sensing license for a
satellite.67 Besides the FCC and NOAA, a commercial entity wishing to launch
a satellite into space must also consult with the FAA (which regulates
commercial launches and reentries) to obtain a license for launching that same
satellite.68 Although consulting with multiple agencies to partake in regulated
activities is not unusual, the problem with the current approach is the
overlapping nature of many of these burdensome requirements. However, these
burdens could be significantly lessened by the creation of a coordinated,
comprehensive independent agency dedicated specifically to minimizing these
administrative burdens, which often come at great financial cost to commercial
actors. Therefore, the regulatory patchwork for commercial space activities
highlights the current inefficiencies and burdensome bureaucratic hurdles
commercial space actors must overcome—largely because of the absence of a
centralized agency designated specifically to address commercial space
activities.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has also determined
that the current fragmentation and overlap in national security space acquisition
management has contributed to program delays and cancellations, cost
increases, and inefficient operations.69 In 2012, the GAO identified sixty
national security space stakeholder organizations across the Federal
Government that shared oversight and acquisition management responsibilities,
leading the GAO to conclude that this fragmented leadership contributed to poor
coordination and lengthy decisionmaking, such that space technologies

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

VEDDA & HAYS, supra note 13, at 16.
Id.
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 9, at 8.
VEDDA & HAYS, supra note 13, at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
KATHLEEN J. MCINNIS & STEPHEN M. MCCALL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11172, “SPACE FORCE” AND
RELATED DOD PROPOSALS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/
IF11172.
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frequently became obsolete by the time these systems were deployed.70 Since
the passage of the CSLCA, Congress has repeatedly been made aware of the
fragmented structure of federal regulations and the management of the
commercial space industry by the OSC.71 In particular, Congress is well aware
of the need to restructure the regulatory and management framework as the
commercial space industry grows and incorporates activities such as space
tourism, asteroid and moon mining operations, and the exploration of Mars and
beyond.72
Federal recognition of the inefficiencies stemming from the current
fragmented regulatory approach to commercial space activities has led to the
creation of numerous oversight and management entities, such as the National
Space Council73 and the OSC.74 However, these entities do not (and cannot) go
far enough because they lack central regulatory functions,75 as a result of the
current moratorium on the regulation of commercial space activities established
by the CSLCA—as a way to allow the commercial space sector to develop
without costly and burdensome regulations in an unexplored area.76 For
example, the National Space Council’s function is merely to provide advice on
civil, commercial, and military space issues and to coordinate the
implementation of the President’s space policies.77 However, it is unclear how
such an entity would go about implementing these policies without possessing
some regulatory power. Both the National Space Council and the OSC have
provided recommendations to Congress to improve the current regulatory
framework for commercial space activities, yet these have all gone nowhere due
to Congress’s current gridlock, which siphons Congress’s attention away from
these administrative matters towards other politically expedient and
controversial legislations.78 Although the creation of a new administrative
agency requires congressional action, the current regulatory inefficiencies will
continue to worsen without a dedicated agency with the authority to promulgate
the aforementioned recommended changes.
However, unless otherwise extended by Congress, the current moratorium
on the regulation of commercial space activities (or “learning period”) will
70. Id.
71. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24.
72. Id.
73. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 9, at 14 (“[T]he National Space Council was established in 1989 ‘to
provide a coordinated process for developing a national space policy and strategy and for monitoring its
implementation.’”).
74. Id. at 9 (“Under the authority of 51 U.S. § 50702, the Commerce Department’s Office of Space
Commerce is the department’s ‘principal unit for the coordination of space-related issues, programs, and
initiatives.’”).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 6.
77. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 27, at 12.
78. KING, supra note 27, at 12–13 (describing legislative proposals sent to Congress to establish an entity
for administering regulations of commercial spaceflight activities not overseen by the FAA, such as asteroid
mining, on-orbit satellite servicing, and other commercial endeavors).
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expire in October 2023.79 Given the expected exponential growth of the
domestic commercial space industry,80 it is imperative that Congress tackle the
current fragmented regulatory framework proactively rather than continue its
current “hands off” approach.81 The commercial space industry’s relatively
nascent regulatory framework has allowed agency roles to not yet fully settle.
This provides an opportunity for Congress to methodologically incorporate the
different parts of the current fragmented framework into a holistic regulatory
scheme that can avoid the pre-FEMA-type deficiencies and convolutions that
plagued U.S. emergency disaster management in the past.82
IV. WHY COMMERCIAL SPACE REGULATIONS MUST BE PROMULGATED BY AN
INDEPENDENT EXECUTIVE AGENCY
Given the global implications inherent in any commercial space activities,
regardless of the activities’ origin, regulations aimed at these activities must use
an effective approach in order to truly serve as a “model” for other countries to
emulate. An agency entrusted with promulgating regulations for commercial
space activities must be governed by expertise, not only in the subject matter,
but also in the global dynamics implicated in any regulatory scheme it expounds.
The principal avenue by which Congress can guarantee that experts, not
politicians, would be the driving force behind commercial space policies is
through the establishment of an independent agency.
The principal distinction between an independent and traditional regulatory
agency is that independent agencies are more likely to be free from the
President’s political influence.83 This relative independence stems from several
characteristics generally shared by independent agencies, such as having
multimember boards (as opposed to a single director) that reach decisions by a
majority vote, with members serving for a term of years on a staggered basis as
a way to ensure that a President is unable, in a single term, to replace the entire
governing body.84 Additionally, an independent agency normally requires that
no more than a simple majority of its board come from a single political party,
thereby ensuring, or at least making it more likely, that agency decisions would

79. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 9, at 6 (explaining that the moratorium, or learning period, was initially
enacted in 2004 for an eight-year period but has been subsequently extended several times—most recently in
2015 as part of the CSCLA).
80. See ALYSSA K. KING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IFF11351, IMPACT OF COMMERCIAL LAUNCH ACTIVITIES
ON AVIATION (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/space/IF11351.pdf (highlighting that the FAA predicts commercial
space launches will increase from an average of 21 launches from 2013–2018 per year to up to 56 by 2021).
81. 51 U.S.C. § 50905(c)(3) (“The Secretary [of Commerce] shall continue to work with the commercial
space sector . . . to facilitate the development of voluntary industry consensus standards based on recommended
best practices . . . as the commercial space sector continues to mature.”)
82. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 9, at 2.
83. See WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE &
PRACTICE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 15 (6th ed., 2018).
84. Id.
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be based on expertise rather than simply furthering a particular political party’s
preferences.85
Another typical feature of independent agencies that safeguards agency
actions from operating as purely political decisions is that, unlike executive
agencies whose heads generally serve “at the pleasure” of the President,
members of independent agencies normally can only be removed “for cause.”86
Protecting agency administrators from dismissal unless the President can
provide proper cause is important because without these protections, the
President can always fire an administrator simply for disagreeing with White
House demands regarding the content or outcome of particular rulemaking
decisions.87 The importance of ensuring that any designated agency for
commercial space regulations be independent was also endorsed by the
Department of Commerce in 2018, when it proposed making the OSC an
independent bureau that, among other functions, would oversee commercial
space traffic management.88
Currently, under the proposed agency structure contained in the ASCFEA,
the responsibility for promulgating regulations for commercial space activities
is delegated solely to the Secretary of Commerce, who invariably serves at the
pleasure of the President.89 As such, the proposed agency structure does not
protect expertise from direct political pressure, facilitating the potential for
presidential abuse, which could lead to disastrous and counterproductive
consequences. That being said, even independent agencies can still face political
reproach from Congress through budget cuts or by being called to testify at
hearings.
Placing politics above expertise was at the heart of the United States’
decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(“JCPOA”)90—commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal—in May of
2018.91 This ideologically-based decision has led to lasting and
counterproductive repercussions that the United States is still attempting to
resolve.92 After then-President Trump directed the Secretary of the Treasury to
reinstate all U.S. sanctions—which had been waived as part of the JCPOA—and
85. Id. (“[I]n a commission of five members, no more than three could be from one party.”).
86. Id. at 15, 606 (“Almost all the principal officers whose removal can only be for cause are members of
independent boards or commissions.”).
87. Id. at 616.
88. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 27, at 12.
89. American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act § 80103(c)(5), § 80202(c)(6) (establishing that
responsibilities for applications and certifications thereof may not be delegated by the Secretary, including to
the OSC).
90. Reza Sayah & Nick Schifrin, Iran’s Top Nuclear Scientist Discusses the Potential for a Nuclear Deal
with the U.S., PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 9, 2021, 6:45 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/irans-topnuclear-scientist-discusses-the-potential-for-a-nuclear-deal-with-the-u-s.
91. Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.
92. Sayah & Schifrin, supra note 90 (detailing how Iran began exceeding some of the deal’s nuclear limits
and restricting required inspections following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal by the Trump administration).

January 2022

WHAT GOT US HERE, WON’T GET US THERE

119

impose additional economic penalties93 on Iran without having a proper reason
(Iran was in compliance with the JCPOA), the Iranian government began
ignoring its JCPOA obligations and exceeding its nuclear limits, while
restricting nuclear inspections in protest.94
The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA because of the
political whims of a president, exemplifies the problems that arise from allowing
politics, rather than expertise, to be the primary driver in consequential global
decisionmaking. Commercial space regulations, which invariably have global
ramifications, must be structurally safeguarded against such political caprice and
the best regulatory framework that can accomplish this goal is through an
independent executive agency.
A. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS EMANATING FROM THE PROPOSED ASCFEA
FRAMEWORK
Apart from failing to shield important expert-dependent regulatory
decisions from undue political influence, the proposed ASCFEA framework also
fails the United States’ National Space Policy Memo’s goals of “[e]ncourag[ing]
other nations to adopt United States space regulatory approaches and
commercial space sector practices” in several ways.95
First, the current version of the ASCFEA handicaps the Secretary of
Commerce’s ability to improve and refine the process for issuing certifications
and permits for commercial space activities, unless those improvements are
specifically delineated in the ASCFEA.96 Given the novel and evolving nature
of commercial space policymaking, such arbitrary restrictions on the designated
administrative body run afoul of the stated objectives expressed in the National
Space Policy Memo, which directs agency heads to “[e]nhance operational
efficiency, increase capacity, and reduce launch costs by investing in the
modernization of space launch infrastructure.”97 By prohibiting the Secretary
from deviating from the congressionally prescribed certification and permit
process, the ASCFEA frustrates the United States’ national policy goals of
creating an efficient commercial space regulatory framework that can “sustain
future reliable, resilient, and efficient access to space.”98 An inflexible
regulatory framework in a constantly evolving policy area is not the type of
structure the United States should adopt itself, nor encourage other nations to
adopt.99

93. Landler, supra note 91.
94. Sayah & Schifrin, supra note 90.
95. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,761.
96. American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act § 80301(d).
97. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,758.
98. Id.
99. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,761 (explaining that restructuring the current
commercial space regulatory framework should also seek to “[e]ncourage other nations to adopt United States
space regulatory approaches and commercial space sector practices”).
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Second, the ASCFEA establishes a mechanism for unconditional automatic
approvals of commercial launch applications if the Secretary has not approved
or denied them within ninety days from submission.100 However, this
mechanism is flawed because commercial space launch applications should
always be thoroughly reviewed, regardless of any bottleneck issues the
approving administrative body suffers from. Having this automatic mechanism
could inadvertently harm the development of commercial space enterprises
because the ninety-day window might not allow enough time for the designated
agency to make an informed decision given the inherently global, complex,
expensive, and hazardous environment in LEO.101
Further, the proposed automatic approval process can create a perverse
incentive that rewards applicants for “running the clock” by deliberately
avoiding responding to questions from the government or doing so very
slowly.102 Additionally, given the United States’ goal of creating a “model”
commercial space regulatory framework,103 this type of automatic approval can
prove disastrous if another country’s commercial space vehicles or platforms
obtain its launch approval this way and then experience in-orbit system failures
that result in catastrophic international damages or casualties.
Third, the ASCFEA also establishes certain concerning presumptions that
bind the Secretary, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, when
making launch application determinations.104 In particular, the presumption that
“reasonably commercially available efforts” by commercial entities are
sufficient to conform with the United States’ international obligations fails to
sufficiently uphold the spirit of the commitments established under the Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space Bodies including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer
Space Treaty”).105 The Outer Space Treaty details the responsibilities of
signatory nations in their operation and management of space, including
commercial activities by non-governmental actors within their jurisdictions.106
Article IX of the treaty stipulates that signatories shall conduct all activities in
outer space in a manner that avoids harmful contamination of space and celestial
bodies, including adverse changes in the Earth’s environment.107 However,

100. H.R. 3610 § 80103(b)(3).
101. VEDDA & HAYS, supra note 13, at 33–34.
102. Id. at 34.
103. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,761 (explaining that restructuring the current
commercial space regulatory framework should also seek to “[e]ncourage other nations to adopt United States
space regulatory approaches and commercial space sector practices”).
104. H.R. 3610 § 80103(c)(3).
105. Id.; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. VI, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 2415, 610 U.N.T.S. 205,
209 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
106. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 105, at 2418.
107. Id. at 2416.
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simply presuming that “reasonably commercially available efforts”108 carried
out by commercial space entities are sufficient to meet the United States’
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, without a system that can ensure a
country’s adherence to their responsibilities under the treaty, is not the type of
“model” system the United States should encourage other nations to adopt.
For example, Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) systems, currently being
developed by BWX Technologies,109 can easily meet the ASCFEA’s
“reasonably commercially available efforts” presumption. Whether these
systems meet the United States’ obligations under Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, however, is an open question.110 Article IV prohibits signatories from
placing into orbit any objects “carrying nuclear weapons,” yet the feasibility of
creating nuclear material from what is primarily a source of rocket fuel is
questionable and therefore it is unclear whether this possibly violates Article
IV.111 With these uncertainties, imbedding a “model” system with these types of
presumptions is a mistake.
Finally, although the National Space Policy Memo advocates for a
commercial space regulatory framework that can be exported to other nations in
an effort to “[p]romote the adoption of [United States’] policies and practices
internationally,”112 the ASCFEA lacks any language or mechanism aimed at
international cooperation in the administration and management of commercial
space activities. Given the global implications involved in any commercial space
activities, a comprehensive regulatory approach governing these activities must
incorporate some mechanism that facilitates international cooperation between
commercial space agencies. Any regulatory framework lacking such a
mechanism is not worthy of exporting to other nations.
V. THE IDEAL COMMERCIAL SPACE AGENCY—A BETTER APPROACH
Considering the deficiencies in the ASCFEA’s approach to commercial
space regulations, an ideal approach would ensure that policymaking decisions
are primarily based on expertise rather than politics through the use of an
independent agency. Like the appointment structure used by the FCC, a future
independent commercial space agency should be headed by five members, each
of whom would be appointed for a five-year term on a staggered basis, so that
their terms do not expire at the same time.113 The appointed members should
only be removable by the President from their roles “for cause,” such as for
108. H.R. 3610 § 80103(c)(3).
109. Nuclear Thermal Propulsion, BTX TECHNOLOGIES, INC., https://www.bwxt.com/what-we-do/nuclearthermal-propulsion-ntp (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
110. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 105, at 2413 (“States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in
orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”).
111. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 105, at 2413–14.
112. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 761.
113. WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (6th ed., 2020).
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malfeasance in office or neglect of duties.114 Additionally, by ensuring that no
more than a simple majority of its members come from one political party, the
five-member board would be protected from undue political pressure.115 Like
other independent agencies, all agency policies and changes thereto would be
decided through a majority vote, similar to a legislative assembly.116
The promulgation of regulations for commercial space activities should be
enacted through notice-and-comment rulemaking (commonly referred to as
“informal rulemaking”) because it lacks the two basic requirements of formal
rulemaking: (1) that rules be made on the record and (2) after an opportunity for
an agency hearing.117 An informal rulemaking procedure would allow the
agency to address all interested parties and give them the opportunity to
influence commercial space regulations through comments submitted to the
agency following publication in the Federal Register.118 Since commercial space
regulations adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking would be based
on the administrative record, including comments submitted by interested
parties, any challenges to the regulations should be reviewed directly in a court
of appeals, rather than a trial court, given that there would be no disputed facts
requiring testimony.119
Similar to the language enacted in the statutory mandate of the FCC, an
ideal independent commercial space agency would employ language that
specifies that the purpose for establishing the agency is to secure a more
streamlined execution of commercial space regulations by centralizing the
authority that is currently vested among several agencies and granting the new
agency additional authority for the effective execution of its statutory
mandate.120 Although the main impetus for creating a centralized independent
agency is to have a comprehensive regulatory body for the coordination and
management of commercial space activities, such an agency must nonetheless
include interagency protocols for the coordination of in-orbit commercial
operations with other agencies, including the FAA, which manages the use of
national airspace by traditional aircraft operations and increasingly commercial
space launch operations.121 Once the independent agency is established, the
incorporated units from the other agencies would simply supplant their statutory
authority with that of the newly-created agency.

114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 8.
117. Id. at 177.
118. Id. at 180–83.
119. Id. at 210–11.
120. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (stating “for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of this policy by
centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with
respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a commission to
be known as the ‘Federal Communications Commission’”).
121. KING, supra note 80.
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Although Article II of the Outer Space Treaty mandates that “[o]uter space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means,”122 the CSLCA nonetheless recognizes celestial property rights for
any U.S. citizen engaging in “commercial recovery” of asteroids or other space
resources.123 Without exploring further whether the “commercial recovery”
provision of the CSLCA is in conflict with Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty,124 any agency regulating commercial space activities must develop a
regulatory framework for the management of such “recoveries.”125 Taking into
account Article I’s language in the Outer Space Treaty, which declares that
“[t]he exploration and use of outer space…shall be the province of all
mankind,”126 any such agency would be entrusted with ensuring that the United
States complies with its international treaty obligations. That agency must also
consider the possibility of developing a regulatory scheme that considers
whether Article I requires an equitable distribution of any profits or other
benefits derived from the exploitation of outer space resources.127 Although
“province of all mankind” connotes notions of equality among signatories, this
language was generally considered at the time to represent an expansion of the
international legal principle of res communis, which traditionally was
understood to simply mean a prohibition on appropriating whatever matter it
referred to.128
However, other signatories to the treaty have since interpreted “province
of all mankind” as vesting upon all nations rights in common resources that

122. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 105, at 2413.
123. Pub. L. No. 114–90, 129 Stat. 705 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and
51 U.S.C.); 51 U.S.C. § 51302–03 (“A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid
resource or a space resource under this chapter shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource
obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in
accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States.”).
124. Kurt Taylor, Fictions of the Final Frontier: Why the United States Space Act of 2015 Is Illegal,
33 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 653, 656–57 (2019), https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol33/iss4/6
(arguing that the CSLCA’s “commercial recovery” provision violates the non-appropriation doctrine in Article
II of the Outer Space Treaty because it bars states from claiming territorial ownership of celestial bodies and
resources); see also Masson-Zwaan & Palkovitz, supra note 3, at 8–9 (maintaining that the CSLCA violates
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and Article 11 of the Moon Agreement of 1979 for failure to reach an
international agreement before engaging in commercial mining activities).
125. See The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,761 (directing the Secretary of State in coordination
with the heads of federal agencies to “[e]ncourage international support for the recovery and use of outer space
resources”).
126. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 105, at 2412.
127. Sarah Coffey, Establishing A Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural Resources in Outer
Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 133–34 (2009) (arguing that the Outer Space Treaty and Moon
Agreement of 1979 requires an equitable distribution of any exclusive rights to the exploration and exploitation
of space resources).
128. J.I. Gabrynowicz, The “Province” and “Heritage” of Mankind Reconsidered: A New Beginning, in
THE SECOND CONFERENCE ON LUNAR BASES AND SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 691, 692 (W. W.
Mendell ed., 1992), https://space.nss.org/the-second-conference-on-lunar-bases-and-space-activities-of-the21st-century.
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should be shared among all nations.129 Understanding if the CSLCA’s
“commercial recovery” provision takes into account the former rather than the
latter interpretation of “province of all mankind” is not critical for crafting a
comprehensive statutory mandate for an agency regulating commercial space
activities, as long as the agency has the flexibility to incorporate the equitable
interpretation of the treaty, if necessary. Given the altruistic nature of such a
directive, any domestic regulatory agency entrusted with its adherence must
operate as freely as possible from political and self-interested motivations,
further underscoring the necessity of making such an agency independent. Some
might argue, however, that because these regulatory decisions about commercial
space activities involve national resources and the rights of U.S. citizens, they
present political questions and thus require a political response. This perspective
fails to understand the fundamental purpose served by administrative agencies:
namely, the effective and efficient implementation of expert-driven policies in
areas that require expertise. If Congress is concerned that regulatory decisions
will have a negative impact on the country’s national interests, these concerns
are already adequately addressed by the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process imbedded in the agency’s decision-making process. One of the benefits
of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process is the ability of all interested
parties to raise concerns regarding a particular rule the agency is considering by
submitting comments to the agency. Therefore, even if an agency’s regulatory
decisions touch on political questions, the notice-and-comment rulemaking
framework provides an avenue for political responses to influence the agency’s
final decision.
Alongside establishing interagency management capabilities, the new
agency must also include interoperability protocols for the development of a
global space ecosystem that seamlessly shares and communicates in-orbit SSA
data.130 Global cooperation in the management of commercial space activities is
crucial to the development of any “model” regulatory framework the United
States hopes to export to other nations, given the global implications involved
in in-orbit accidents.131 To have a flourishing and robust LEO economy, the
independent agency must also have the capability of overtaking the DOD’s
space traffic management system and working in tandem with the DOD to share
SSA data with commercial actors, both domestic and foreign, as proposed by
SPD-3.132
The need for a centralized, well-coordinated regulatory agency for
commercial space activities, which includes orbital debris mitigation, is apparent
when taking into account the economic concept of the “tragedy of the

129. Id.
130. The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,761 (enumerating that part of the United States’ national
policy objectives must include protocols that “[e]ncourage interoperability among United States, allied, and
partner space systems, services, and data”).
131. Id.
132. Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 15, at § 4(d).
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commons.”133 The “tragedy of the commons” describes circumstances in which
individual users have unlimited access to a particular “common” resource, yet
as a result of an inadequate regulatory framework, these individuals act
independently out of self-interest and exploit the common resource, driving its
depletion and ultimately reducing its availability to all.134 As described by
Garrett Hardin in his influential piece The Tragedy of the Commons, the solution
to this type of collective action problem is through the regulation of usage
established in administrative law.135
The limited “common” resource at play in the regulation of commercial
space activities is space itself, particularly the allocation of limited LEO space.
Currently, there are few limitations, in the United States or abroad, on the
number of space objects being launched into LEO due to the prevailing attitude
that “in orbit, it seems, there is always room for one more.”136 However, after
decades of unrestricted use, there has been an ever-increasing buildup of orbital
debris,137 which now poses a substantial threat not only to current operations in
space, but also to the development of a robust LEO economy because of the
possibility of the Kessler syndrome.138 Proposed by Donald Kessler, a retired
NASA senior scientist for orbital debris research, the Kessler syndrome
describes a self-sustaining domino effect that is created when the density of inorbit objects increases such that collisions between those objects can cause a
cascading, self-sustaining, runaway cycle where each collision generates more
orbital debris, thereby increasing the likelihood of further collisions until it
ultimately renders space activities in LEO impractical and too hazardous.139
Since the inception of the space age more than 5,000 launches have resulted
in over 43,000 tracked objects of which about 23,000 continue to be monitored
and tracked by the DOD.140 The majority of space debris is created as a result of
in-orbit breakups and in-orbit collisions.141 Although in-orbit collisions
currently only account for a very small percentage of space debris, the recent
introduction of commercial space actors into LEO has increased the likelihood
of such collisions exponentially. The first-ever accidental in-orbit collision
133. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968) (discussing the
problem that arises when individuals utilize resources “common” to all in such a self-interested manner that said
limited resources become depleted for all).
134. See id. at 1244.
135. Id. at 1246.
136. Leonard David, Space Junk Removal Is Not Going Smoothly, SCI. AM. (Apr. 14, 2021),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-junk-removal-is-not-going-smoothly (“And with few
meaningful limitations on further launches into that increasingly congested realm, the prevailing attitude has
been persistently permissive: in orbit, it seems, there is always room for one more.”).
137. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 7.
138. David, supra note 136.
139. Louis de Gouyon Matignon, The Legal Status of Space Debris, SPACE LEGAL ISSUES (June 23, 2019),
https://www.spacelegalissues.com/the-legal-status-of-space-debris.
140. Id. (explaining that this large amount of space debris has a total mass of more than 7,500 tons,
equivalent to the mass of the Eiffel Tower).
141. Id.
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between two satellites occurred on February 10, 2009, when a privately owned
U.S. satellite, Iridium 33, collided with a Russian military satellite, Kosmos
2251.142 As a result of the collision, more than 2,300 trackable fragments were
generated and continue to cause problems for current operations in space.143 The
increased threats to both government and commercial space activities has been
further exacerbated by the proliferation of satellite “mega constellations” by
companies such as SpaceX (through its Starlink system) and OneWeb, who are
using these satellites to create global broadband internet networks.144 Additional
commercial actors, such as Amazon and its Project Kuiper, are expected to add
to the number of space objects in LEO, with Amazon projecting to launch up to
3,200 satellites in the near future.145
Given the growing congestion of space objects and the absence of a
comprehensive regulatory framework to curb this congestion, the threats posed
by these “mega constellations” and other orbital debris have already impacted
activities in LEO. For example, the congestion has forced the ISS to regularly
adjust its orbit to avoid potentially hazardous debris, underscoring the need for
the development of coordinated, comprehensive regulations for commercial
space activities that could contribute to the Kessler syndrome.146 For example,
on April 23, 2021, astronauts of SpaceX’s Crew-2 mission for NASA were
forced to re-suit as a safety precaution after a piece of space debris passed
unexpectedly close to their Crew Dragon capsule.147 Most recently, on
November 16, 2021, astronauts aboard the ISS once again were forced to seek
shelter due to fears of an in-orbit collision as the station passed through a freshly
created cloud of orbital debris produced when Russia intentionally destroyed a
defunct satellite named Cosmos 1408.148 These recent events underscore the very
real threats posed by a congested LEO and the Kessler syndrome. A new
independent agency dedicated to regulating commercial space activities should
consider developing end-of-life protocols for the disposal of satellites as a way
to proactively minimize the congestion in LEO rather than merely relying on the
current norm of natural decay.149 In doing so, such an agency would establish a
proper model framework that other nations can emulate.
The issues emanating from the current “tragedy of the commons” as
applied to LEO, and the increasing possibility of the Kessler syndrome, cement
the need for an agency entrusted with coordinating and regulating commercial
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. David, supra note 136.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Tariq Malik, A Piece of Space Junk Zipped by SpaceX’s Dragon Capsule on Its Way to the Space
Station, SPACE (Apr. 24, 2021), https://www.space.com/amp/spacex-crew-2-dragon-capsule-space-junk.
148. See Nadia Drake, Russia Just Blew Up a Satellite—Here’s Why That Spells Trouble for Spaceflight,
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space activities to establish an unprecedented global ecosystem, free of political
influence, that is focused solely on ensuring the safety of space operations and
facilitating the development of norms, standards, guidelines, and best practices
in accordance with the objectives outlined in the U.S. National Space Policy.150
CONCLUSION
The exponential growth of the commercial space sector over the last decade
underscores the need for an independent, comprehensive, and centralized
regulatory body to coordinate and manage the plethora of developing
commercial space activities, currently estimated to be a $424 billion industry.151
In addition to planned private space flight operations by commercial actors such
as Virgin Galactic152 and Blue Origin,153 the number of commercial space
activities expected in the near future continues to expand. Orbital Assembly, a
large space construction company, announced plans to begin construction of the
world’s first space hotel that will be housed on a commercial space station,
“Voyager Station,” by 2026.154 Other commercial actors have redirected their
efforts away from providing commercial services and instead have targeted their
efforts towards commercial manufacturing of space products, such as 3-D
printed rockets and robotics.155 These nascent and promising industries
invariably require establishing comprehensive regulatory schemes that would
not only facilitate their widespread adoption through the elimination of
bureaucratic hurdles stemming from the current fragmented and decentralized
regulatory framework, but would also create a stable system these industries can
begin to rely on when making important and costly business decisions.
The commercial space era is no longer a distant, speculative fever dream
of science-fiction enthusiasts, it is currently the next phase of the United States’
national space policy objectives for “[f]acilitat[ing] new market opportunities
for United States commercial space capabilities and services.”156 To
“[e]ncourage other nations to adopt United States space regulatory approaches
and commercial space sector policies,”157 the United States must learn from its
150. See The National Space Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. at 81,760–61.
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to Open a New Frontier, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
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total, for Virgin Galactic’s upcoming space opportunities, and thousands more are on a waitlist.”).
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prior inefficient, fragmented regulatory approach exposed by the pre-FEMA
emergency management framework.158 The United States has a fleeting
opportunity to establish a model system for commercial space activities that
places expertise above politics through an independent agency. This framework
has novel mechanisms that would encourage other countries to not only emulate
it, but also to begin to lay the foundation for the development of a much needed
globally-connected space ecosystem.

158. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 38, at 17.

